9 10 11 KEY WORDS 12 Novelty-seeking, Information-seeking, Exploration, Problem Gambling, Addiction, Reinforcement 13 learning 14 15 Supplemental Information: Yes 16 17 18 Novelty-seeking, information-seeking and addiction 2 ABSTRACT 19 Information-seeking is an important aspect of human cognition. Despite its adaptive role, we have rather 20 limited understanding on the mechanisms that subtend information-seeking in healthy individuals and in 21 psychopathological populations. Here, we aim to formalize the computational basis of healthy human 22 129 choosing options associated with the lowest gain (in the equal information condition; Supplement) 6 . In 50% 130 of the games, participants played the unequal information condition. The order of card selection was 131 randomized in both information conditions, as was the occurrence of the equal and unequal information 132 conditions.
information behavior, as well as how those components may be compromised in behavioral addiction. We 23 focus on gambling disorder, a form of addiction without the confound of substance consumption. We 24 investigate and model human behavior using a novel decision-making task and a novel reinforcement 25 learning model. Our results indicate that healthy information behavior is motivated by both novelty and 26 general knowledge (or information). In contrast, problem gamblers have a specific deficit in novelty 27 processing in choice behavior, but not in general information. This finding sheds light both on the 28 computational mechanisms underlying healthy human information behavior, and on how they can go awry 29 in behavioral addiction. 30 31 INTRODUCTION 32 Humans spend considerable time in seeking information. Information-seeking is therefore an 33 essential aspect of human cognition that supports healthy decision-making and goal-directed processing 1 2 3 .
34
Here, we argue that human information behaviors can be driven by both the desire for novelty and the level 35 of general knowledge or information: how much the decision maker wants to know about novel information 36 available in the environment and how many pieces (or bits) of information she has already acquired in the 37 past. This distinction can be relevant in understanding psychopathologies such addiction where individuals 38 are trapped into the same behavioral routines (e.g., gambling, substance intake, binge eating) despite the 39 negative consequences associated with them (e.g., financial loss, healthy problems 4 ). Engaging in these 40 repeated behaviors may be due to an inability to either represent and implement novel behavioral patterns 41 (novelty) or to higher weights given to already known ones (general information). Here, we aim to formalize 42 the computational basis of healthy human information behavior and how it may be compromised in gambling 43 disorder, a form of addiction without the confound of substance consumption.
44
Information-seeking behaviors are often contraposed to the human tendency of maximizing 45 immediate benefits. A decision-maker who is trying to find out the best restaurant in town may try out all 46 different available options in order to obtain information on the potential benefit of each restaurant, but this 47 information search may be costly or result in unpleasant experiences. Yet, information-seeking has a 48 significant role in human daily activities (e.g., exploring, reading, searching, asking questions etc..). A 49 number of studies 5 , including our own 6 7 , have suggested that healthy humans finely balance the urge for 50 immediate reward vs. longer-term information gain during sequential decision-making (i.e., exploration-51 exploitation trade-off). Appropriately balancing this tension is a necessary tool for navigating in a world 52 fraught with uncertainty and changeable dynamics. Resolving this tension plays a key role, for instance, in 53 foraging problems 8 , complex decisions in the human daily life 9 , and even boosting the performance of 54 artificial agents 10 11 . And, deficiency in its resolution has been observed in psychopathological conditions 55 such as addiction 12 and depression 13 . Previous work, however, has not specifically considered the 
63
To study information behavior under repeated scenarios, we adopt a modified version of a popular 64 task (i.e., the multi-armed bandit) often used to study sequential learning and decision-making behavior. In the bandit task, the decision-maker must make repeated choices among options characterized by initially 66 unknown reward distributions. Each choice can be driven either by a more myopic desire to maximize 67 immediate gain (based on knowledge gained from previous choices and outcomes) or by a more long-term 68 goal of being more informed about all the options. In these repeated scenarios, however, the more the 69 decision-maker tends to choose the most rewarding options, the more those rewarding options tend to be 70 (anti-) correlated with the amount of (remaining) information that can be obtained 16 5 . Accordingly, these 71 classical decision-making tasks make it difficult to quantify exactly how much reward and information each 72 contribute independently to choices 5 . Here, we therefore adopt a novel variant of the bandit task 6 , inspired 73 by 5 , which has an initial phase of forced choices that carefully controls for reward and information associated 74 with each option. Thus, it dissociates the relative contribution of reward and information as motivating factors 75 in choice behavior.
76
To investigate the role that novelty-seeking and general information-seeking play in human 77 information behavior, we introduce a new learning and decision-making model for the bandit task that makes 78 it possible to quantitatively separate out the importance of novelty versus general information in driving 79 human information behavior.
80
To explore the role that novelty and general information-seeking play in addictive disorders, we 81 compare a pathological gambling group to a healthy control group. The focus on problem gambling, as 82 opposed to substance abuse, allows us to target the behaviors underlying addiction without the confounding 83 effects of chronic substance use and abuse 17 . The inclusion of the problem gambling group not only allows 84 us to identify the processes and mechanisms that are altered in behavioral addiction, but also to reveal 85 modular processes that operate semi-autonomously in the healthy brain and thus can independently break 86 down in pathological conditions. Indeed, as our study will demonstrate, problem gamblers have a specific 87 deficit in novelty processing in choice behavior, but not in general information seeking or in reward seeking.
89

METHODS AND MATERIAL
90
Participants 91 Forty (40) unmedicated problem gamblers (PG's; mean age = 30.1, mean 4 female) and twenty-two (22) 92 healthy controls (mean age = 29, 4 female) were recruited from the local communities. The sample size of 93 both groups was based on previous studies 18 6 . We excluded participants having co-morbidity with 94 substance abuse and alcohol use disorder or undergoing psychological and pharmacological treatment and 95 with injuries involving the brain ( 
Behavioral Task 112
Participants performed 162 games of a decision-making task 6 which allow to orthogonalize the influence of 113 reward and information on sequential choices 5 ( Fig. 1a , Supplement). On each game, participants were 114 initially instructed about which option (deck of cards) to choose from on each trial (forced-choice task; Fig.   115 1b) for six consecutive trials, after which they were free to choose from any of the options (free-choice task; 
121
In order to perform the decision task, participants should alternate exploration vs. exploitation 122 choices. During exploration, participants can either choose at random (undirected exploration) or they can 123 direct their exploration toward the most informative or novel alternative (information-driven exploration) 5 .
124
In order to dissociate between these two behavioral patterns, we implemented two conditions in the forced-125 choice task 5 . Participants were either forced to choose each deck 2 times (equal information condition), or 126 to choose one deck 4 times, another 2 times, and the third 0 times (unequal information condition).
127
Information-driven exploration was then defined as choosing options that had never been sampled during the 128 forced-choice task (in the unequal information condition), while undirected exploration was defined as 134 135 Figure 1. Behavioral paradigm and RL model. a) On each trial participants make choices between 3 decks of cards. After selecting 136 a deck, the card turned and revealed the points associated with the selected option, between 1 and 100 points. Participants were 137 instructed to attempt to maximize the total points earned at the end of the experiment. b) On each game, participants faced two 138 phases: the forced-choice task (6 consecutive trials) and the free-choice task (between 1 and 6 trials; participants were not aware 139 of the task length). In the forced-choice task, participants were forced to choose a preselected deck. In the free-choice task, 140 participants made their own choices among the same three decks of cards displayed during the forced-choice task. At this stage, 141 the points displayed on the screen were added to the participants' total score after each choice. In the first free-choice trial (in 142 yellow), reward and information are orthogonalized, so enabling the distinction between undirected and information-driven 143 exploration 5 . c) The reinforcement learning (RL) model uses reward and information in the environment to learns expected reward 144 values (reward prediction) and information prediction on a trial-basis. Next, it combines these predictions into a value function in 145 order to determine choices stochastically using a softmax function. d) On each trial, novelty-knowledge RL (nkRL) model updates 146 its reward prediction using the delta learning rule. Using this rule, novel reward predictions are made by integrating new outcomes 147 (i.e., the points obtained after a trial) to previous reward predictions. The degree by which this integration is achieved is controlled 148 by the learning rate . With small the model slowly updates its estimate in response to new outcomes, whereas with higher values 149 the model integrates new reward outcomes more rapidly. Next, it computes information prediction as sum of general information 150 and novelty term. The general information term describes the level of general information participants have about the selected 151 option. In other words, it defines how many information bits have been acquired by the decision-maker. The novelty term, on the 152 contrary, captures the desire for novelty. In other words, it defines how much the decision-maker wants to know about a novel 
Computational modelling 158
During the execution of the decision-making task, humans generate both reward and information 159 predictions which jointly guide choices 6 . This can be formalized using a computational model which 160 follows a reinforcement-learning (RL) routine ( Fig. 1c ). In particular, the RL model learns expected reward 161 values and information on a trial-basis, and combines them into a value function in order to determine 162 choices stochastically 6 (Supplement). In order to investigate the nature of information valuation in healthy 163 participants and problem gamblers, we implement a novel computational model which combine reward and 164 information evaluation as previous formulations 6 , but also dissociates between novelty and general 165 information during information valuation. Our model, the "novelty-knowledge RL" (nkRL) computes 166 expected reward values using the delta learning rule 20 (Fig. 1d ). In addition, as in previous RL versions, 167 the predicted value of a deck is a combination of reward and information prediction (Eq. S3). However, the 168 information term is split into two components resulting in the following value function: 
RESULTS
182
Information behavior in healthy individuals and problems gamblers 183
We first investigated information-seeking behavior in both groups by looking at the first free-choice trials 184 (namely, the one trial where we can be sure that information and experienced reward are uncorrelated 5 ; 185 Supplement). We focused on those games where information-driven exploration can be quantified i.e., 186 unequal information condition. We classified choices as information-driven when participants selected 187 options that had never been sampled during the forced-choice task, as reward-driven when participants 188 chose the experienced decks with the highest average of points (regardless of the number of times that deck 189 had been selected during the forced-choice task) and other when the classification did not meet the previous criteria (e.g., choosing a familiar deck with a relatively low average reward value). In particular, we 191 calculated the number of trials in which information-driven, reward-driven and other strategy was adopted 192 by each subject and we averaged those estimates across trials. This gave the averaged probability of each 193 strategy adopted by each subject during the task. A 2 (Group: PGs, Controls) X 2 (Strategy: Reward-driven, Figure 2a ). Other choices did not differ between 200 the two groups (p = 0.08). The decrease in information-driven exploration was independent of the reward 201 context (Supplement; Figure S1 ) and on the reward condition participants were in (Supplement). Moreover, 202 the impairment in exploration was absent when the exploratory strategies were not motivated by an 203 informative drive (i.e., undirected exploration; Figure 2b 
231
Probabilities were averaged across games. Information-driven exploration decreases and reward-driven strategy increases in 232 problem gamblers (PGs) compared to healthy controls. b) Probability of choosing reward-driven and undirected exploration in the 233 first free-choice trial of the equal information condition (i.e., when options are sampled equally during the forced-choice task). No 234 differences were observed between the two groups. c) Probability of selecting options the outcome of which was experienced the 235 most (Most-Sampled), the least (Least-Sampled) and the mid (Mid-Sampled) number of times during previous trial history.
236
Probabilities were averaged across games. Problem gamblers frequently selected Most-Sampled options at the expense of Least-
237
Sampled alternatives compared to controls. Both groups showed higher preference for familiar options (Most-Sampled). d) In 238 problem gamblers, the probability of selecting Least-Sampled options positive correlated with working memory (WM) capacity 239 (computed using the working memory subset of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -WAIS IV; r = 0.347, p = 0.028, n =40). As 240 reported in Table 1 , working memory capacity did not differ between problem gamblers and healthy controls as a group. e) Controls 241 showed a novelty-familiarity shift by showing an increased preference toward novel options (Least-Sampled) in the first free-242 choice trial and an increased preference for familiar alternatives (Most-Sampled) in the last free-choice trial. d) Problem gamblers 243 showed no preference between novel and familiar alternatives in the first free-choice trial, while in the last free-choice trial higher 244 preferences toward familiar options were exhibited. In all the figures, error bars are represented as standard error of the mean 245 (s.e.m).
Novelty-seeking in healthy individuals and novelty failure in problem gamblers 247
In order to elucidate the mechanisms underlying information valuation in healthy controls and 248 problem gamblers, we turn to model-based analyses.
249
We first checked whether reward and information combination during learning could better explain 250 participants' behavior compared to only computing reward predictions (Supplement). We replicated our 251 previous findings 6 by showing that combining reward and information prediction better accounts for learning 252 processes in both groups. Next, we compared the ability of our model -nkRL-to explain participants' 253 behavior compared to a previous RL model of the same task (i.e., gkRL; Supplement). Despite the two models gamblers (PGs) compared to controls, while the knowledge parameter  did not differ between the two groups (b). Learning rate  is reduced in problem gamblers compared to controls (c), while the decision noise did not differ between the two groups (e). d)
290
In problem gamblers, the novelty bonus increased as a function of working memory (WM) capacity (r = 0.371, p = 0.018, n =40).
292
DISCUSSION
293
In this study, we adopted behavioral, self-reported, and computational measures to individuate the processes 294 underlying human information behavior in healthy individuals and problem gamblers. We observed 295 alternations in problem gamblers' information behavior compared to the healthy control group, as a 296 consequence of a failure to represent novelty but not general information. By showing functional 297 dissociations between novelty-induced exploration and general information, this study not only sheds light 298 on the novelty-seeking impairment in addiction, but also highlights the importance of both novelty and 299 general information-seeking in human information behavior, and their likely functional and biological 300 dissociation in the human brain. 
320
In contrast, we found that there was no difference between healthy controls and problem gamblers 321 in terms of the softmax decision policy's temperature parameter fitted to the two subject groups. This 322 temperature parameter has sometimes been interpreted as representing "undirected exploration" or decision 323 "noise" in the literature 32 5 . However, we note that any trial-to-trial variability in decision choice that is not 324 accounted for explicitly by our model (in terms of reward or information value) would be absorbed into this 325 decision stochasticity parameter. It is important to recognize that such apparent decision stochasticity could either reflect true "noise" (or "undirected" exploration) in human choice behavior, or it could simply reflect 327 the fact that our model insufficiently capture trial-by-trial variability. In any case, our results suggest that 
334
While our results showed novelty-seeking impairment in problem gamblers, different explanations 335 may account for this impairment. One possibility is that problem gamblers may quickly jump to conclusion. (Table 1) , the number of control participants we were able to include in the 347 study after pre-screening was 22 (Supplement). The behavioral pattern observed in the control group ( Figure   348 2a, S3a), however, replicates our previous findings on healthy humans playing with the behavioral task 349 adopted in the current study 6,7 . Furthermore, although testing problem gamblers appears relevant for Our results on novelty-seeking impairment in addiction not only provide insights on information-360 seeking alterations in addiction, but also deepens our understanding of information-seeking in general. We 361 showed that healthy human behavior is motivated by reward gain and information gain, and the later 
SUPPLEMENTARY METHODS
519
Clinical and demographic characteristics 520
Inclusion/exclusion criteria were examined the day before the experiment by conducting a short telephone 521 interview as well as on the day of the experiment by filling self-reported questionnaires presented in a 522 random order during the last part of the experimental session. The telephone interview was adopted as pre-523 screening for both gamblers and controls. We specifically asked for information concerning age, gender, 
543
Test for Nicotine Dependence-FTND 5 . Seven participants reported to smoke, but only 2 were classified 544 with a mid-dependence and 2 with a weak-dependence, the other 3 were not dependent. Given that the main 545 statistical results remained unchanged after removing those participants, we decided to include them in all 546 the analyses. Additionally, to avoid the scenario that participants under psychological treatment may have 547 developed a certain type of cognitive strategy over their decision processes, we included only participants 548 who were not undergoing or seeking for psychological treatment. Moreover, we only included regular 549 gamblers that were gambling at least once per week. Finally, we recruited both strategic problem gamblers 550 (sport betting, poker, black jack; N=22) and non-strategic problem gamblers (bingo, lotto, slot machine, 551 roulette; N=18) 6 . Given that no behavioral difference was found between the two sub-types (in line with 7 ), we combined strategic and non-strategic gamblers in the same gambling group in all analyses reported 553 in this manuscript.
554
Healthy controls 555 The inclusion criteria for the healthy control group were as follow: CPGI=0 and no gambling experience in 556 the past 12 months. 40% of control participants reported to have gambled in the past years, whereas the rest 557 of the group reported to have never gambled in their life. As for the problem gambling group, we only 558 included participants who scored DAST < 2 (with 17 subjects DAST = 0) and AUDIT < 12 (for the men), 559 11 (for the women) (with 17 subjects scored AUDIT< 8; M = 5.3, SD = 3.1). Three participants reported to 560 smoke, two of them showed no sign of addiction (FTND = 0 ; 2) and one showed mid-level of addiction 561 (FTND = 7). Removing this participant did not change the main statistical results, therefore the participant 562 was included in all the analyses.
563
Behavioral Task 564
In the decision-making task, the influence of reward and information on choices is orthogonalized in the 565 first free-choice trial (since after the commencement of the first free-choice trial, subjects tend to choose 566 the more rewarding options more often, thus reward and information become anti-correlated). In particular, 567 adding a forced-choice task before the actual decision task allows to control for available information and 568 the reward magnitude associated with each option (i.e., options associated with the lowest amount of 569 information were least associated with experienced reward values) 8 . This procedure allows to dissociate 570 between information-driven exploration and undirected exploration. For instance, in the unequal sampling 571 condition, the deck never selected during the forced choice task has highest informative value (it is 572 completely unknown to participants) but it has no reward value associated with. By choosing that deck, 573 participants are engaging in information-driven exploration. On the contrary, in the equal information 574 condition, no differences are observed in terms of information. Therefore, whenever participants choose to 575 explore, this strategy is not driven by an informative drive but only by decision noise 8 .
576
As reported in the main text, the goal of the decision-making task is to maximize the final gain. The final 577 gain is represented as the amount of points earned throughout the experiment. The total gain is showed to 578 participants at the end of the experiment and converted in a monetary payoff (0.01 euros every 60 points).
579
We adopted the same conversion procedure for both groups. However, because gamblers play regularly 580 with higher amounts of money that those offered in our study, their contribution in the study was payed 2.5 581 more than in healthy controls. This modification was introduced in order to minimize the differences in 582 motivation between the two groups during the experiment.
583
Furthermore, the reward was generated from a truncated Gaussian distribution with a fixed standard 584 deviation of 8 points, and then rounded to the nearest integer. The generative mean for each deck was set 585 to 30 (Low Reward Context) and 50 (High Reward Context) points and adjusted by +/-0, 4, 12, & 20 points (i.e., the generative means ranged from 10 to 70 points), to avoid the possibility that participants might be 587 able to discern the generative mean for a deck after a single observation. The 3 decks of cards had the same 588 generative means in 50% of the games (equal reward) and different means in the rest of the games (unequal 589 reward). In the unequal reward condition (50% of the total games), the generative means differed so that 590 two options had higher means compared to the third one in 25% of the total games (High Reward Context) 591 and had lower means in the remaining games of the unequal reward condition (Low Reward Context). The 592 appearance of the equal and unequal reward conditions was randomized. Participants were told that during 593 the forced-choice task of certain games they could sample options at different rates, and that the decks of 594 cards did not change during the same game, but were replaced by new decks at the beginning of each new 595 game. However, they were not informed of the details of the reward manipulation or the underlying 596 generative distribution adopted during the experiment. Contrary to our previous versions of this task 9 10 , in 597 half of the games of the equal reward-equal information condition, we introduced an unusually high reward 598 outcome (with respect of the deck mean in that game) for a specific option (e.g., 90 points) the first time 599 that this option was selected in the forced-choice task (subsequently the mean of the deck was set to its 600 original value). This manipulation was introduced as a control condition in order to test whether gamblers' 601 perseverate in choosing a generally poor option that they initially have a good experience with (the 'big 602 win' hypothesis for gambling addiction 11 ).
603
Computational Modelling 604
In this section, we first describe the RL model already validated for our task (gamma knowledge RL model-605 gkRL 9 ). Next, we describe our novel implementation (nkRL). Lastly, we report the information concerning 606 model fitting, selection and parameter recovery. where, , = , ( ) − , ( ) (S1) 611 where , ( ) is the expected reward value for trial t and game j and , is the prediction error, which 612 quantifies the discrepancy between the previous predicted outcome , ( ) and the actual outcome 613 , obtained at trial t and game j. Since participants were told that games were independent from one 614 another, 0 is initialized at the beginning of each game to the global estimate of the expected reward values 615 for each deck. We previously showed that this initialization was better able to capture healthy participants' 616 behaviour than learning 0 on a trial-by-trial basis 9 . In addition, gkRL accumulates information over time 639 Indeed, in gkRL information-driven exploration is allowed by dynamically devaluating previous options in 640 order to explore new alternatives and by tuning the information magnitude; however, this formulation 641 cannot differentiate the relative influence of general information and novelty on choices, since they are 642 completely anti-correlated in gkRL. Therefore, we dissociate general information from novelty by utilizing 643 a novel RL model i.e., nkRL.
644
As described in the main text nkRL computes expected reward values as in Eq. S1. Our novel model, obtaining the observed data given a particular model). We adopted an approximation to the (log) model 657 evidence, namely the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 14 . We checked the model comparison outcome 658 by computing a confusion matrix and checking whether data generated from a model was indeed best 659 explained by that model. In order to inspect the fitting procedure for overfitting we adopted cross validation 660 procedure 15 . We fitted nkRL and gkRL to 70% of the trials and we tested their ability to predict choices on 661 future data (30% of the trials) compared to a simpler nested model (i.e., standard RL model -sRLwhich 662 enters directly enters reward values +1, into Eq. S4 without integrating information). We then adopted 663 the likelihood ratio test to determine if the better fit of complex models (i.e., nkRL and gkRL) was due to 664 noise captured in the data. Both nkRL and gkRL were correctly able to predict future choices.
665
Statistical analysis 666
Statistical analysis was performed using RStudio (https://www.rstudio.com/). When violations of 667 parametric tests were indicated, non-parametric tests were performed. P-values < .05 were considered 668 significant. 669 670 X Strategy (all p > 0.807) suggesting that the observed decision-making impairments were independent on 704 the reward conditions subjects were in.
705
Equal sampling scenario 706 In this section, we investigate whether the impairment in exploration also arises when exploration was not 707 driven by an informative drive. To do so, we estimated the frequency of undirected exploration and reward-708 driven strategy in the first-free choice trials of the equal information condition i.e. when options have been 709 seen the same number of times during the forced-choice task. Choices were classified as reward-driven 710 when participants chose the deck with the highest average points and undirected exploration otherwise. A 711 2 (Group: PGs, Controls) X 2 (Strategy: Undirected Exploration, Reward-driven) between ANOVA 712 revealed an effect of strategy F(2,120) = 205.4, p < 10 -15 . However, the interaction effect Groups X Strategy 713 and the Group effect were not significant (p > .05; Figure 2b ), suggesting that, when information is deployed 714 equally among options, problem gamblers engage in exploratory behaviors similarly to healthy controls.
715
Familiarity vs. Ignorance
716
In Figure 2c of the main text we showed that both groups preferred familiar options compared to options 717 they were more ignorant about (p < 10 -4 ). In order to confirm this result, we computed participant's tendency 
735
In the main text and in the previous section we showed that both groups preferred most familiar options 736 over novel options, and this tendency was reversed in the control group during the first free choice trials.
We further showed that both groups preferred novel options over mid-known alternatives in the first free 738 choice trials (Figure S2 d) . In order to understand whether the information-seeking impairment in problem 739 gamblers is a result of a novelty-seeking impairment or of general information impairment, we directly 740 compared the two groups preference over mid-known alternatives in the first free choice trial of the unequal 741 information condition. If the information-seeking impairment is driven by general information, gamblers 742 should also decrease the selection of mid-known alternative (which in the free choice trial of the unequal 743 information condition corresponds to the option sampled twice during the forced choice task, and therefore 744 less known to them). A Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test showed higher tendency to choose Mid-Sampled 745 options in problem gamblers (M =0.27, SD = 0.084) compared to controls (M =0.203, SD = 0.112; p = 746 0.015) suggesting that information-seeking impairment in gamblers might be specific to the representation 747 of novelty, rather than an impairment in general information. To better clarify this point, we turn to the 748 model based analyses.
749
Novelty-seeking in healthy individuals and novelty failure in problem gamblers 750
Nested models 751 Even though the combination of reward and information was already shown in healthy human subjects 9 10 , 752 we checked if this was still the case in our experimental groups (problem gamblers and healthy controls).
753
To do so, we compare gkRL to a simpler nested model i.e., sRL (which doesn't integrate information into Figure S3c) . Lastly, the analysis showed no difference in the softmax parameter between the two groups, 768 p = .302 (MG = 0.599, SDG = 1.199; MC = 0.139, SDC = 0.073, ( Figure S3d ).
nkRL vs. gkrl
We compared the ability of nkRL to explain participants' behavior compared to a previous RL model of 771 
774
Thus, gkRL and nkRL are equally good in explaining overall participants' choices (Figure 3a, b ). However, 775 in order to increase the probability of accurately estimating individuals' model parameters, both models 776 were fitted to all free choices. Being the first free trials the trials were the differences between the two 777 groups are mostly observed, we simulated both models using the parameters estimated. The rationale is that 778 the differences between the two models in predicting participants' behavior may occur in the first free 779 choice trial only. And, fitting the models to all free choices may average out the differences, if any, in the 780 first free choice trials. In order to tell a part potential differences between gkRL and nkRL in the first free 781 choice trial, we simulated both models using the parameters estimated during the fitting procedure and 782 analyzed their predictions in both first and last free trials. In particular, we analyzed the models' tendency 783 to choose Most-Sampled and Least-Sampled alternatives in the first and last free-choice trials. Both models 784 predict a "novelty-familiarity" shift for the control groups (p < 0.001, as shown in participants' data Figure   785 2e; Figure 3d , f). However, gkRL predicts increased preferences toward frequently selected options for 786 gamblers (p < 0.01; Figure 3e ), while nkRL predicts no difference between familiar and novel options (p > 787 0.05, Figure 3c ). Therefore, only our novel model was able to reproduce the behavioral pattern observed in 788 problem gamblers' data during the first free choice trials.
789
Personality traits
790
In this section, we explore the correlations between model parameters and personal traits and the individual 791 differences between problem gamblers and controls.
792
We observed significant correlations in problem gamblers between the novelty bonus  and working memory 793 capacity (r = 0.371, p = 0.018, pfdr = 0.037, n =40; Figure 4d ), sensation seeking (measured using sensation-794 seeking scale -SSS; 22 ; r = 0.321, p = 0.043, pfdr = 0.043, n =40) and sensitivity to reward (measured using 795 punishment and reward sensitivity questionnaire-SPSRQ; 23 ; r = 0.354, p = 0.025, pfdr = 0.037, n =40). pfdr 796 is the p-value after correcting for multiple comparison. Additionally, the knowledge parameter  positively 797 correlated with sensation seeking (r = 0.344, p = 0.03, n =40). Also, we observed a negative correlation 798 between softmax parameter  and positive mood (computed using PANAS-Table1; r = -0.314, p = 0.049, n 799 =40), suggesting that the more gamblers were feeling enthusiastic and active the more they were flexible in 800 their decision policy.
801
We conclude our analyses by comparing individual differences between the two groups to investigate 802 whether personal traits could explain the differences observed throughout our analyses. We focus on 803 intolerance of uncertainty (EII 25 ), impulsivity (UPPS-P 26 ), sensation-seeking (SSS 23 ), and sensitivity to punishment and reward (SPSRQ 24 ). Comparisons between healthy controls and problem gamblers revealed 805 no differences in the scores obtained from EII (p = .785, BF01 = 3.61), UPPS-P (p = .217, BF01 = 1.89), SSS 806 (p = .483, BF01 = 3.02), and SPSRQ (sensitivity to reward p = .399, BF01 = 2.81; sensitivity to punishment p 807 = .266, BF01 = 2.4), suggesting that the behavioral alterations observed in problem gamblers are unlikely to 808 be explained as differences in terms of personality traits (or in some cases there was not substantial evidence 809 in favor of the alternative hypothesis). These results appear to suggest that information-seeking impairments 810 in addictive disorders might be related to a process or mechanism that is independent from individual 811 subjective preferences toward uncertainty, novelty, and reward.
812
The 'big win' hypothesis 813
The results reported in this study showed that problem gamblers' decision-making alterations when solving 814 our sequential decision-making were driven by alterations in information behavior as a consequence of a 815 failure to represent or incorporate novelty. However, these parametric alterations might have been 816 confounded by the inability of problem gamblers of moving away from an option after experiencing fairly 817 positive outcomes in the past, i.e., the 'big win' hypothesis. To better investigate this point, we computed the 818 empirical probability of choosing an option associated with an unusually high score ("big win" options) when 819 first selected in the forced-choice task. A two-sample t test showed no differences in the probability of 820 choosing the "big win" option in problem gamblers (M = 0.607 SD = 0.187) compared to controls (M = 0.596 821 SD = 0.144), p = .798 suggesting that alterations in decision-making observed in problem gamblers were not 822 driven by their particular persistence in choosing options associated with unusually good outcomes in the 823 past.
824
Beyond gambling addiction 825
We investigate whether the decision-making task we adopted (and related computational model) might be 826 able to explain other psychopathologies. We observed a positive correlation between Beck Depression 827 Inventory (BDI) and undirected exploration (r = 0.3, p = 0.048, n =62) suggesting that the more participants 828 were scoring high on the depression scale the more they were increasing undirected exploration as already 829 observed in 16 . We additionally observed a negative correlation between the learning rate computed estimated 830 nkRL model and BDI (r = -0.3, p = 0.045, n =62) and a positive correlation between the softmax parameter 831  and BDI (r = 0.3, p = 0.02, n =62). Table   Table S1   Table S2   Table S3   Table S4 
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